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Abstract 
Organ trafficking is a transnational issue that calls for a response from the 
international medical community. Despite consistent condemnation, organ trafficking 
persists due to the worldwide shortage of organs for transplantation. This paper 
discusses the human rights abuses perpetuated by organ trafficking and suggests some 
approaches to reducing organ trafficking and transplant tourism. The paper concludes 
that combating organ trafficking requires a cohesive response from the international 
community of states, comprising of mutually reinforcing legal reform at international 
and domestic levels. In particular, states should seek to lighten the burden on the 
worldwide shortage of organs by increasing local supply. This paper considers 
presumed consent to be the most effective system of organ procurement. As such the 
paper suggests a framework for implementing presumed consent in New Zealand, in 
order to increase organ donation rates.  
Word count 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, appendices and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 15,616 words. 
Keywords 
Organ trafficking, transplant tourism, organ donation, presumed consent, Human 
Tissue Act 2008. 
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I Introduction 
International organ trafficking poses an increasingly acute concern for the 
international medical community. The issue is rooted in the worldwide shortage of 
organs for transplantation. The early 1980s saw the development of ciclosporin, an 
immunosuppressant drug used to prevent organ rejection after transplantation. Since 
then, organ transplantation has become a common, life-saving procedure.1 However, 
the full life-saving potential of organ transplantation cannot be realised, as the 
worldwide demand for organ transplants exceeds the supply of organs.2 The majority 
of domestic organ transplantation systems rely on altruistic donations from living 
donors, and those who consent to have their organs donated upon death. These 
systems do not produce enough organs to match demand. There is a particular 
shortage of kidney donations, the most common form of living organ donation.3  
As is inevitable where demand exceeds supply, the shortage of organ donors has led 
to the development of a thriving international black market in organs. The 
international traffic in organs is a continuing problem that requires a response from 
the international medical community collectively, as well as individual states. While 
precise figures are difficult to determine due to the nature of the trade, it was 
estimated at the Second Global Consultation on Human Transplantation of the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) in March 2007 that organ trafficking accounts for 5 – 10 
per cent of the kidney transplants performed annually throughout the world.4 The 
failure to internationally regulate the black market organ trade can be traced to a 
failure in both international cooperation and more alarmingly, to individual states' 
unwillingness to enact domestic legislation to a) reflect and uphold their international 
obligations vis-à-vis organ trafficking and b) to address the root problem of organ 
trafficking, being the shortage of donated organs for transplant. It appears that many 
states turn a blind eye to the problem because of the health benefits for the recipients 
of organs acquired through trafficking.  
                                                
1  David J Rothman and Sheila M Rothman Trust is Not Enough: Bringing Human Rights to 
Medicine (The New York Review of Books, New York, 2006) at 5. 
2  At 3. 
3  A Rithalia and others "A systematic review of presumed consent systems for deceased organ 
donation" (2009) 13 Health Technology Assessment 1at 1. 
4  D A Budiani-Saberi and F L Delmonico "Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism: A 
Commentary on the Global Realities" (2008) 8 American Journal of Transplantation 925 at 925. 
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This paper argues that organ trafficking is an issue of international scope that requires 
mutually reinforcing responses from the international medical community and 
domestic legal systems. The response must be twofold: first, it must seek to stop the 
existing organ traffic through criminalisation of organ trading and enforcement and 
secondly, it must address the root cause of organ trafficking – the worldwide shortage 
of organs for transplantations. The worldwide shortage of organs is best addressed 
through increasing local supply of organs to meet domestic transplantation needs. 
International solutions will be unsuccessful unless accompanied by domestic 
legislation, especially given the wide differences in healthcare across states and the 
unique cultural, religious and societal considerations of each state in formulating 
health policy.  
Part II of this paper provides a brief overview of organ trafficking and its effects.  Part 
III discusses theoretical underpinnings of organ procurement, which has traditionally 
been rooted in altruism.  Part IV discusses the components required for a cohesive 
response to organ trafficking, which encompasses both international and domestic 
measures. This paper argues that in practical terms, introducing more effective organ 
procurement systems into domestic legislation will deliver more immediate outcomes 
for increasing the organ supply than international solutions. As such, Part V will 
present and analyse the commonly proposed approaches to increasing domestic organ 
supply. These proposed approaches include: conscription, mandated choice, soft 
presumed consent, hard presumed consent, and non-financial incentives. This paper's 
preferred approach is hard presumed consent. Part VI considers practical aspects in 
implementing presumed consent. Change begins at home; thus Part VII outlines a 
framework for presumed consent in New Zealand. Māori perspectives on organ 
donation must inform the discussion on a proposed presumed consent system in New 
Zealand.  
Focus will be had on New Zealand. First, New Zealand is implicated in the worldwide 
shortage of organs. According to Organ Donation New Zealand, in 2012 there were a 
total of 174 transplant operations from live and deceased donors.5 At 8.6 per million 
people for deceased donors and 12.9 per million for living donors, New Zealand's 
                                                
5  Organ Donation New Zealand "Statistics" <www.donor.co.nz>. 
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current organ donation rates are among the lowest in the developed world.6 Secondly, 
New Zealand provides an example for how other states might also implement 
presumed consent in order to increase domestic supply. Each state that effectively 
addresses its own organ shortage lessens the burden of the worldwide shortage, 
thereby adding to the overarching mutually enforcing domestic and international 
response to organ trafficking.  
This paper concludes that, given the reality of organ trafficking, the international 
medical community should simultaneously consider ways of ameliorating the 
currently ineffective international regulation of organ trafficking whilst promoting 
domestic presumed consent legislation for organ donation. New Zealand must 
actively consider moving to a presumed consent system for organ donation.  
II Organ Trafficking Background 
This Part briefly outlines how organ trafficking works and its effects. This paper 
proceeds on the basis that organ trafficking is an existing and ongoing concern for the 
international medical community. It focuses on international and domestic solutions 
for reducing organ trafficking, rather than particulars such as trading routes, donor 
demographics or statistics.  
A Definitions  
In 2009 the WHO published a glossary of terms and definitions, noting the need for 
globally uniform terminology to clarify communication in the area of donation and 
transplantation.7 This paper uses the WHO definitions as the internationally accepted 
definitions, despite the fact that they are not binding legal definitions at international 
law. The WHO is the body responsible for international health matters for member 
states of the United Nations, of which New Zealand and the case studies discussed in 
this paper are member states. Thus the definitions are useful reference points. Many 
of the definitions refer specifically to the domestic laws of member states.8 As such, 
the glossary serves as a guideline for lawmakers in individual states, while the law is 
recognised as the appropriate regulatory means for domestic organ transplantation.  
                                                
6  Organ Donation New Zealand "International Donor Rates" <www.donor.co.nz>. 
7  World Health Organisation "Global Glossary of Terms and Definitions on Donation and 
Transplantation" (Geneva, November 2009) at 3. The key definitions are given in the main text. 
For further useful definitions see Appendix 1. 
8  See for example the definitions of 'exporting', 'importing' and 'consent'. 
Reducing Organ Trafficking: New Zealand's International and Domestic Responsibilities 
 
 6
According to the WHO, organ trafficking is:9 
[t]he recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring or receipt of living or deceased 
persons or their cells, tissues or organs, by means of the threat or use of force or 
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of 
power or of a position of vulnerability, or of the giving to, or the receiving by, a 
third party of payments or benefits to achieve the transfer of control over the 
potential donor, for the purpose of exploitation by the removal of cells, tissues 
and organs for transplantation. 
Transplant tourism is:10 
[t]ravel for transplantation when it involves organ trafficking and/or transplant 
commercialism or if the resources (organs, professionals and transplant centers) 
devoted to providing transplant to patients from outside a country undermine the 
country's ability to provide transplant services for its own population. 
Transplant commercialism is "a policy or practice in which cells, tissues or organs are 
treated as a commodity, including by being brought or sold or used for material 
gain."11 
For ease of reference, 'donors' will be used throughout this paper to refer to those who 
give their organs for transplantation, whether altruistically or as a result of organ 
trafficking, although in the strict sense organ trafficked persons cannot truly be 
considered 'donors'.12  
B How Organ Trafficking Works 
Organ trafficking is a transnational operation, involving any number of people from 
different states. More individuals are involved beyond the 'donor' and the organ 
recipient. There are typically organ brokers, who source the organ, transport and 
deliver the organ, organise travel for 'donors' and recipients, and collect the money.13 
There are the medical professionals who perform the organ transplantations. All of 
these individuals may come from the same state, or each from a different state. The 
                                                
9  World Health Organisation, above n 7, at 14. 
10  At 14. 
11  At 14 
12  See Appendix 1 for the WHO definition of 'donor'.  
13  I Glenn Cohen "Transplant Tourism: the Ethics and Regulation of International Markets for 
Organs" (2013) 41 J L Med & Ethics 269 at 273. 
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numerous combinations of persons and states implicated in the organ trafficking chain 
inevitably give rise to difficulties in international regulation.  It becomes difficult to 
determine a) precisely where culpability should lie and b) which states are responsible 
for which part of the organ trafficking chain.  
Trafficking in organs occurs in two broad categories. First, there are cases where 
traffickers coerce, threaten or deceive the 'donor' into giving up an organ. Secondly, 
there are cases where 'donors' agree to sell an organ and are cheated because they are 
not paid for the organ or are paid less than the promised price.14 Forms of organ 
trafficking and transplant tourism, include (but are not limited to):15 
• A recipient travelling from State A to State B, where the donor and the 
transplant centre are located; 
• A donor travelling from State A to State B, where the recipient and transplant 
centre are located; 
• A donor and a recipient travelling from State A to State B where the transplant 
centre is located; 
• A donor from State A and a recipient from State B travelling to State C where 
the transplant centre is located. 
High-exporting organ states include India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey and 
Colombia.16 High-importing states (referring to the states of origin of those who 
purchase organs for transplantation) include Israel, Canada, Japan, Australia, the 
United States, Saudi Arabia and Oman.17  
C Human Rights Issues 
There are obvious human rights issues associated with organ trafficking. The 
international black market in organs resulting from the worldwide shortage gives rise 
to many human rights abuses.18 The WHO definition for organ trafficking includes 
                                                
14  Sheri R Glaser "Formula to Stop the Illegal Organ Trade: Presumed Consent Laws and 
Mandatory Reporting Requirements for Doctors" (2005) 12 Hum Rts Brief 20 at 20. 
15  Budiani-Saberi and Delmonico, above n 4, at 926. 
16  Yosuke Shimazono "The state of the international organ trade: a provisional picture based on 
integration of available information" (2007) 85 Bulletin of the World Health Organisation 955 at 
957. 
17  At 957. 
18  Sarah Elizabeth Statz "Finding the Winning Combination: How Blending Organ Procurement 
Systems Used Internationally Can Reduce the Organ Shortage" (2006) 39 Vand J Transnatl L 
1677 at 1679. 
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terms such as use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power and 
exploitation.19 An illegal organ procurement method that encompasses one or more of 
the above cannot be anything but a breach of human rights. Organ trafficking violates 
the right to human dignity, the right to life, the right to self-determination, the right to 
liberty, the right to security in prison and the right to freedom from cruel or inhumane 
treatment.   
The Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) emphasises that 
the "inherent dignity…of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world".20 Human dignity is further affirmed in art 1.21 The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) also note, using identical wording, 
that "the rights [contained within] derive from the inherent dignity of the human 
person"22 Human dignity is stripped where a person is forced into a position in which 
they are vulnerable to organ trafficking.  
Both the ICCPR and ICESCR guarantee the right to self-determination.23 Organ 
trafficking removes the right to self-determination, by removing the trafficked 
person's ability to make a free and informed choice about their healthcare and whether 
or not to give up an organ.   
Article 6 of the ICCPR guarantees the right to life.24 Article 7 protects against 
"torture…cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment" as well as 
subjection "without free consent to medical or scientific experimentation".25 Organ 
trafficking may breach both of these articles. Exploitation of prisoners for organs 
breaches arts 9 and 10.26 Finally, the ICESCR recognises "the right of everyone to the 
                                                
19  World Health Organisation, above n 7, at 14.  
20  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (ratified 10 December 1948), Preamble. 
21  Article 1. 
22  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976), Preamble; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 993 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 3 January 1976), Preamble.   
23  Article 1 of both Covenants.  
24  Article 6. 
25  Article 7. 
26 Articles 9 and 10. Respectively the right to liberty and security in prison and the right of persons 
deprived of their liberty to be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person. 
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enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health"27, which 
is implicated when victims of organ trafficking receive inadequate medical care 
during and following organ removal. The commercial transaction is the central aspect 
of organ trafficking; the organ becomes a commodity and financial considerations 
often become the priority over the health and well-being of both the 'donors' and 
recipients.28  
In practice it is difficult to enforce the broadly framed rights contained within the 
international human rights instruments. Claims under these international instruments 
must be brought against states; it is unlikely that a victim of organ trafficking would 
have the resources to do so. Further, the breaches are too broad to attribute to the 
actions of any one state. For example, while being coerced or deceived into donating 
an organ may breach art 7, it is difficult to frame being forced to sell an organ due to 
poverty in relation to the conduct of a state. Many states do not stringently enforce 
laws against organ sales. In China, organ trafficking has developed as a by-product of 
China's use of the death penalty. Although China is a signatory to the ICCPR, it is an 
open secret that officials remove organs from executed prisoners to sell for use in 
transplant surgeries, which breaches arts 9 and 10.  Although China's official stance is 
to ban the buying or selling of human organs and tissues, the practice nonetheless 
continues.29  
D Informed Consent and Individual Autonomy  
In addition to international human rights law, organ trafficking also infringes upon 
two key principles of medical ethics: individual autonomy and informed consent. The 
right to human dignity gives rise to the right to individual autonomy, which in turn 
gives rise to the right to bodily integrity.30 Individual autonomy is given effect 
through the doctrine of informed consent.  The principles of individual autonomy and 
informed consent form the basis of medical law and ethics in many Western states, 
including New Zealand.31 The New Zealand Code of Health and Disability Services 
                                                
27  Article 12. 
28  Budiani-Saberi and Delmonico, above n 4, at 926. 
29  Glaser, above n 14, at 20. 
30  Cordelia Mary Thomas "A Framework for the Collection, Retention and Use of Human Body 
Parts" (PhD Law Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2006) at 27.  
31  Informed consent was enshrined as a guiding principle for medical ethics in the Nuremberg Code 
1947 and the subsequent World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki 1975 (revised for 
the sixth time in 2008). Although both relate to research ethics for human experimentation. 
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Consumer Rights 1996 (the Code), which applies to all health care and disability 
services in New Zealand, illustrates the importance of informed consent and 
individual autonomy.  
Organ procurement necessitates involvement from medical professionals. Thus, organ 
trafficking victims are arguably health service consumers, and are entitled to the 
rights of any other patient. Although individual states have different standards of 
patients' rights and codes of ethics, the New Zealand Code will be used as an 
illustration of the potential breaches of patients' rights resulting from organ 
trafficking. 
The Code is known as the patients' bill of rights. It sets out rights, which are legally 
enforceable under the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994.32 Organ 
trafficking breaches the right to be treated with respect, the right to freedom from 
discrimination, coercion, harassment and exploitation, and the right to dignity and 
independence.33  The most comprehensively detailed rights are the right to be fully 
informed,34 and the right to make an informed choice and give informed consent.35 
Under Rights 6(1) and (2), the consumer has a right to receive the information that a 
reasonable consumer, in that consumer's circumstances, would expect to receive, in 
order to make an informed choice. An organ trafficking victim is unlikely to receive 
such information.  
Informed consent is the cornerstone of the Code. Under Right 7(1) services may only 
be provided if that consumer makes an informed choice and gives informed consent. 
Further, under Right 7(7) every consumer may refuse or withdraw consent to services 
and Right 7(10)(a) notes that no body part may be used without the informed consent 
of the consumer. The strength of the Code lies in its recognition that informed consent 
is not a one-off action to authorise a medical intervention, but a process with a 
number of components, including competence, voluntariness, effective 
communication, provision of sufficient information and the giving of consent.36 The 
                                                                                                                                      
informed consent has since become an accepted principle of medical ethics applicable to all 
medical services.  
32  Joanna Manning (ed) The Cartwright Paper: Essays on the Cervical Cancer Inquiry 1987 – 88 
(Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 2009) at 151. 
33  Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights 1996, right 1, 2, and 3. 
34  Right 6. 
35  Right 7.   
36  Manning, above n 32, at 159.
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exploitative nature of organ trafficking does not give effect to any of these elements 
of informed consent.  
The Code is consistent with the WHO glossary definition of consent.37 Ethically 
justifiable organ donation requires the voluntary decision of consent from a competent 
donor on the basis of adequate information. Informed consent must underpin both 
deceased and living organ donation. Organ trafficking does not reflect this 
fundamental principle of medical ethics. For this reason, and the human rights abuses 
discussed above, organ trafficking is an unacceptable form of organ procurement.  
III Theoretical Underpinnings  
A Altruism in Medicine  
Organ trafficking stems from a worldwide organ shortage, which is the result of a 
scarcity in both deceased and living organ donors. To date, an altruistic approach has 
driven organ procurement. This Part outlines the altruistic approach and discusses 
why altruism should remain the basis for organ procurement and should form the 
basis of any proposed solutions to the worldwide organ shortage. 
The seminal work on altruism in social policy is Richard Titmuss' 1970 book The Gift 
Relationship. The work examined whether medical care, in its many component parts, 
is a consumption good indistinguishable from other goods and services in a private 
economic market, through a comprehensive survey of blood donors in England and 
Wales, and the United States.38 The key concern of the study was the national and 
international consequences of treating human blood as a commercial commodity, and 
where the lines should be drawn if blood were legitimised as a consumption good.39  
Titmuss concluded that treating human blood as a saleable good would have 
dangerous ramifications for healthcare policy, and social policy in general. All policy 
would then essentially become economic policy.40 Titmuss noted that human welfare 
is an ethical concept and there is no such thing as economic welfare. Thus a society 
that recognises the social good of social healthcare policy cannot at the same time 
                                                
37  See Appendix 1. 
38  Richard M Titmuss The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy (George Allen & 
Unwin, London, 1970) at 12. 
39  At 12. 
40  At 12. 
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accept monetary exchange for blood donation. Monetary value cannot be attached to 
the spirit of altruism within a society.41 Commercialisation of blood and donor 
relationships represses the expression of altruism, erodes a sense of community, 
lowers scientific standards, limits both personal and professional freedoms, sanctions 
the making of profits in hospitals, subjects critical areas of medicine to the laws of the 
marketplace, places immense social costs on those least able to bear them, increases 
the danger of unethical behaviour in various sectors of medical science and practice 
and results in situations where proportionately more and more blood is supplied by 
the poor.42 
Titmuss' work affirms the proposition that trade in human body parts is not ethically 
desirable and that altruism should underpin organ procurement. Shifting away from 
an altruistic system would mean a loss of the social benefits of the donation process – 
most importantly the valuable social interaction and community building that lies in 
enhancing or saving another's life.43 Organ transplantation is arguably the most 
intensely social of all medical practices, as it relies upon a unique trust between 
society and medical professionals and is dependent on the willingness of ordinary 
people to share their organs with a loved one or even a stranger.44 Moving away from 
an altruistic approach in organ procurement, with its strong tradition of social 
interaction, would require a fundamental shift in conception of medical ethics and the 
language of social justice.45 
B Marketisation?  
Some scholars call for legalisation of the market in both living and deceased organs, 
suggesting that a market-based approach to organ procurement would more 
effectively combat organ trafficking by closing the gap between supply and demand.46 
                                                
41  Titmuss, above n 38, at 198. 
42  At 224. 
43  Christian Williams "Combatting the Problems of Human Rights Abuses and Inadequate Organ 
Supply Through Presumed Donative Consent" (1994) 26 Case W Res J Int'l L 315 at 335. 
44  F L Delmonico and Nancy Scheper-Hughes "Why We Should Not Pay For Human Organs" 
(2003) 38 Zygon 689 at 689. 
45  At 696.  
46  See for example Lloyd R Cohen "Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a 
Futures Market" (1990) 58 Geo Wash L Rev 1; Michael P Jaycox "Coercion, Autonomy, and the 
Preferential Option for the Poor in the Ethics of Organ Transplantation" (2012) 12 Developing 
World Bioethics 135 at 136; Richard Michael Boyce "Organ Transplantation Crisis: Should the 
Deficit Be Eliminated Through Inter Vivos Sales?" (1984) 17 Akron L Rev 283; Michael B Gill 
and Robert M Sade "Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition" (2002) 12 Kennedy 
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Proponents of marketisation found their arguments in the right to individual 
autonomy; an individual should be allowed to do whatever they wish with their 
organs.47   
The significant body of literature arguing for various forms of a legal organ market is 
not canvassed. Moreover, the corollary question of property in body parts, essential to 
regulating a legal market is not discussed. First, this paper considers that organ 
procurement is properly driven by altruism. Secondly, even if a legal market in organs 
could be justified on a philosophical level, practical implementation of a legal organ 
market is unfeasible, particularly in New Zealand. The focus of this paper is on 
practical suggestions for reform of organ procurement law in New Zealand, which 
will lighten the burden on the international shortage of organs by removing any 
incentive for New Zealanders to participate in the organ trafficking chain.  
In his recent book Michael Sandel echoes Titmuss' conclusions as to the 
undesirability of commodifying healthcare.48 Sandel applies two arguments against 
marketisation of moral goods: fairness and corruption. The fairness objection 
considers the inequality that market choices may reflect; the corruption objection 
considers the attitudes and norms that market relations may damage or dissolve.49 
Applied to organs, the fairness argument is concerned with the exploitation of the 
poor in an organ market, pointing to the injustice that can arise when people buy and 
sell things under conditions of inequality or dire economic necessity. The choice to 
sell an organ may not be truly voluntary. The corruption argument is concerned with 
the idea that such markets promote a degrading, objectifying view of the human 
person.50 The argument for corruption cannot be met by establishing fair bargaining 
conditions; it applies under conditions of equality and inequality alike.51  
The fairness objection hinges upon the potential for exploitation, suggesting that a 
market in organs is not in itself morally wrong, only so far as it entrenches 
                                                                                                                                      
Institute Ethics J 17; Arthur J Matas "The Case for Living Kidney Sales: Rationale, Objections 
and Concerns" (2004) 4 American Journal of Transplantation 2007. 
47  Sunny Woan "Buy Me a Pound of Flesh: China's Sale of Death Row Organs on the Black Market 
and What Americans Can Learn From It" (2007) 47 Santa Clara L Rev 413 at 438; Delmonico 
and Scheper Hughes, above n 44, at 693.  
48  Michael Sandel What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (Penguin Group, London, 
2013). 
49  At 110. 
50  At 110. 
51  At 111. 
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inequality.52 In practice however, it is unlikely that legalising the organ market and 
attempting to regulate it would help alleviate inequality between organ sellers living 
in states with poor enforcement mechanisms, and wealthy buyers. It may also 
entrench inequalities between buyers, some of whom may not be able to afford a life-
saving organ. Society recognises that healthcare should not be something that the rich 
may have but not the poor. The very fact that healthcare is government funded in New 
Zealand reflects the fact that our society frowns upon the questionable morality of 
allowing a basic need to be determined by financial status. Governments in 
developing states that are unable, or unwilling to eliminate the black market in organs, 
are unlikely to have the resources to effectively regulate a legal market.53 Thus any 
market in organs continues to be morally objectionable. Moreover, there is danger in 
offering financial incentives to people who would be willing to engage in an activity 
for altruistic reasons. When people are engaged in an activity they consider morally 
worthwhile, offering them money may weaken their motivation by "crowding out" 
their intrinsic moral conviction, defeating the foundations of social health care 
policy.54  
On a practical level, both the WHO and World Medical Association (WMA) strongly 
oppose financial incentives for organ donation, whether living or deceased.55  In 2010, 
the decision-making body of the WHO, the World Health Assembly (WHA) urged 
member States, including New Zealand, to:56 
…promote the development of systems for the altruistic voluntary non-remunerated 
donation…of organs. 
…[and] oppose the seeking of financial gain or comparable advantage in 
transactions involving human body parts, organ trafficking and transplant tourism, 
including by encouraging healthcare professionals to notify relevant authorities 
when they become aware of such practices in accordance with national capacities 
and legislation. 
                                                
52  At 111. 
53  Jaycox, above n 46, at 145. 
54  Sandel, above n 48, at 122. 
55  See World Health Organisation "WHO Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ 
Transplantation" (2010); World Medical Association "Statement on Human Organ, Tissue 
Donation and Transplantation" (52nd General Assembly, Edinburgh, October 2000). 
56  World Health Organisation Human organ and tissue transplantation WHA63.22 (2010), art 2(3). 
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Moving to a legal market would require a significant and controversial shift in 
healthcare policy likely to be contrary to public opinion.57 In New Zealand, trading in 
human tissue for financial gain is prohibited generally, subject to exemptions, under s 
56 of the Human Tissue Act 2008.58  Further, there are currently inadequate 
regulations and enforcement against organ trafficking, on both international and 
national levels, offering little confidence that a market in organs could be effectively 
regulated. Therefore, any proposals for increasing the worldwide organ shortage must 
remain rooted in altruism. 
IV Reducing Organ Trafficking 
To date, neither the international community as a whole, nor the individual states 
within it have responded adequately to the problem of organ trafficking. Attempts to 
regulate the crime of organ trafficking are characterised by gaps in legal provisions, 
weak enforcement and few prosecutions.59 Exploitation of prisoners and poor citizens 
of developing countries calls for a cohesive international response.60 Laws are needed 
that encourage organ donation through legitimate and ethical channels while reducing 
human rights abuses. The existence of the international black market and widespread 
transplant tourism shows that the solution to the organ procurement problem must be 
dealt with on both an international level and a domestic level.61 Cohen suggests a 
fourfold approach to reducing organ trafficking:62 
1. Destination country enforcement; 
2. International documents; 
3. Home country measures including extraterritorial criminalisation; 
4. Improving allocation and supply of organs locally.  
This approach recognises that organ trafficking is a transnational crime, while 
acknowledging that the shortage of organs must also be addressed on a domestic 
level, due to the vast differences in resources between organ importing and exporting 
                                                
57  Erica Teagarden "Human Trafficking: Legal Issues in Presumed Consent Laws" (2005) 30 NCJ 
Intl & Com Reg 685 at 698. 
58  See Appendix 3 for the full text of this provision. Section 56 will be discussed further in Part 
IVC. 
59  Glaser, above n 14, at 20. 
60  Statz, above n 18, at 1682. 
61  At 1680.  
62  I Glenn Cohen, above n 13, at 279. 
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states and the differing capacity of governments to implement health care policy. The 
following Parts discuss each of the components of Cohen's framework for reducing 
organ trafficking, with reference to New Zealand. The New Zealand experience 
illustrates how the framework might be applied in other states, which form the 
international medical community. Particular emphasis is placed on improving 
allocation and supply of organs locally. 
A Destination Country Enforcement  
The most straightforward solution is for individual states to ban illegal organ sales 
and prosecute brokers and medical tourists who purchase organs alike. In theory every 
state but Iran currently criminalises organ sale. However, as seen in Part II, organ 
trafficking and transplant tourism persists in spite of official legal sanctions. First, 
states such as China turn a blind eye because enforcement is a priority of neither 
national law nor international law, and doing so allows a state to ameliorate its local 
organ shortage without using state resources. Secondly, the transnational and 
multimodal nature of organ trafficking means it is one of the most difficult crimes to 
detect and control within any single jurisdiction.63 Universal response to organ 
trafficking is condemnation, but awareness and expertise on how to detect and enforce 
the crime is practically nonexistent. Thus while domestic criminal prosecutions in 
destination states should be encouraged, they are unlikely to be effective on their own 
in ending organ trafficking.64 The growth of the illegal international organ trade is 
properly considered an international medical law issue.65 
B International Law  
International law on organ trafficking faces three problems. First, little by way of 
binding international law specifically addresses the issue. Secondly, there is no 
international enforcement mechanism for the little international law that does exist. 
Thirdly, States parties to the existing international law are unwilling or unable to 
uphold their international obligations to that effect.  
1 Existing International Law  
                                                
63  Leslie P Francis and John G Francis "Stateless Crimes, Legitimacy, and International    
Criminal Law: The Case of Organ Trafficking" (2010) 4 Crim L and Philos 283 at 289. 
64  I Glenn Cohen, above n 13, at 279. 
65  Yosuke Shimazono, above n 16, at 959. 
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The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children (the Protocol), which supplements the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (the Convention), requires States 
parties to criminalise and to establish policies to prevent trafficking in persons.66 
"Organ removal" and sale is included under the definition of human trafficking, as an 
exploitative purpose of human trafficking.67 The purposes of the Protocol include 
preventing and combating trafficking in persons68 and promoting cooperation among 
States parties in order to meet those objectives.69 The Protocol is concerned with 
human trafficking in general; organ trafficking is one of the negative results of human 
trafficking, but not the central focus. New Zealand is party to both the Convention 
and the Protocol.70  
Similarly, the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in 
Human Beings (CEC) includes "removal of organs" in the definition of "trafficking in 
human beings…for the purpose of exploitation"71 and requires parties to the 
Convention to "take measures to establish or strengthen national co-ordination 
between the various bodies responsible for preventing and combating trafficking in 
human beings".72 The Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin 
(Additional Protocol) also prohibits organ trafficking.73 However, neither the CEC 
nor the Additional Protocol impose obligations on states parties other than to co-
operate and co-ordinate. Further, the CEC and the Additional Protocol is open only to 
European signatories.  
In 2010 the WHO issued revised Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and 
Organ Transplantation that states "cells, tissues and organs should only be donated 
                                                
66  Articles 5 and 9. 
67  Article 3. 
68  Article 2(a). 
69  Article 2(c). 
70  United Nations Treaty Collection "Status of Ratification" <treaties.un.org>. There are 177 States 
parties to the Convention and 156 States parties to the Protocol. New Zealand has ratified both, 
along with India, the Philippines, Turkey, Colombia, Israel, Canada, the US, Australia, Japan, 
Oman and Saudi Arabia. These states were all identified as either high importing or exporting 
states in Part IIB of this paper. 
71  Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings CETS 197 
(opened for signature 16 May 2005, entered into force 1 February 2008), art 4. 
72  Article 5 
73  Council of Europe Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin ETS 186 (opened for 
signature 25 January 2005, entered into force 1 December 2009), art 22. 
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freely…without monetary payment."74 The WMA notes "payment for organs and 
tissues for donation and transplantation should be prohibited. A financial incentive 
compromises the voluntariness of the choice."75 The WHO and WMA do not have 
authority to enforce their guidelines. Instead, both bodies merely provide guidance to 
states and domestic medical associations and desperate buyers and sellers rarely 
follow such guidance.76  
International law relating to organ trafficking is a by-product of conventions on 
human trafficking. Lumping the adverse effects of organ trafficking into the same 
category as human trafficking is dangerous, because the two crimes are overlapping, 
but not identical. Appending "the removal of organs" onto a provision against human 
trafficking is clumsy and opens a gap in the law that organ brokers may slip through. 
Organ trafficking is unique because the ultimate recipients of the organs are often 
worthy and desperate individuals, who may not realise the origin of the organ, or may 
not care to find out. The complex chain of organ trafficking and the range of 
individuals implicated in the process means that organ trafficking is a crime that 
deserves standalone regulation. Medical professionals are also implicated in the 
process and organ trafficking infringes on principles of medical ethics. The medical 
element of informed consent and bodily integrity separates organ trafficking from the 
other effects of human trafficking. Criminalising organ trafficking requires sanctions 
upon medical professionals who facilitate the process. It should at least be considered 
a distinct aspect of transnational organised crime under the Convention, given effect 
through a separate Protocol.  
2 Enforcement – a role for the International Criminal Court? 
There is no international enforcement regime for organised transnational crime under 
the Convention. The Protocol requires individual states to criminalise removal of 
organs as a result of human trafficking, but contains neither in-built sanctions on 
states for failing to criminalise, nor specifies how a state might enforce such a rule. 
The best solution to the problem of enforcement is to have international law directly 
involved, although this may be out of reach for the immediate future.  
                                                
74  World Health Organisation, above n 55, Principle 5. 
75  World Medical Association, above n 55. 
76  Erica Teagarden, above n 57 at 687.  
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As it stands, the International Criminal Court (ICC) does not have jurisdiction over 
any aspects of the Convention, much less organ trafficking. The jurisdiction of the 
Court is limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community 
as a whole: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of 
aggression.77 The ICC may only prosecute individuals for the listed crimes.78 Of the 
listed crimes, organ trafficking would most likely fall under crimes against humanity. 
Crimes against humanity include "other inhumane acts…intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health".79 However, the 
acts must be committed "as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
a civilian population."80 Organ trafficking does not have this quality. The person who 
is in need of a transplant usually does not have malicious intent. Organ procurement 
itself, leaving aside the exploitative process, can be considered a societal good – as 
lives are saved. Thus organ trafficking can be distinguished from the crimes within 
the ICC jurisdiction. Those crimes involve states of mind such as intent to destroy a 
whole national, ethnical, racial or religious group.81 It cannot be said that organ 
brokers or buyers have the required mental state. It is difficult to equate desire for 
financial gain with the seriousness of intent required for ICC crimes.  
In the negotiations leading to the Rome Statute there were proposals to include 
additional crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court including crimes of terrorism and 
crimes concerning illicit trafficking in drugs, which were rejected.82 The Committee 
of the Whole noted that drug trafficking or similar crimes were not core crimes that 
were undoubtedly of international concern, although they were of serious and valid 
national concern.83 The Committee considered that the jurisdiction of the Court 
should be restricted to the core crimes at the first stage, especially because drug 
trafficking and terrorism were already subjects of multilateral treaties.84 This 
                                                
77  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2187 UNTS 38544 (opened for signature 17 
July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002), art 5. Crimes of aggression will not come into force 
until 2017.  
78  Article 25. Most often these are former heads of states or leaders of revolutions. 
79  Article 7(1)(k). 
80  Article 7(1). 
81  Article 6.   
82  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Travaux Préparatoires of the negotiations of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crimes and the Protocols thereto 
(United Nations, 2006) at [17].  
83  At [32]. 
84  At [70] and [117]. 
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reasoning may be applied to organ trafficking, which is under the Convention and the 
Protocol.  
Lacking the force of an international judicial body has meant that international law 
relating to organ trafficking has met with limited implementation and limited success. 
In order for international law to address organ trafficking directly there must be first, 
a new convention or a protocol to existing Convention on transnational crime that 
directly addresses the question and secondly, a body for bringing claims, for 
enforcement and for ensuring states meet their domestic enforcement obligations, 
falling perhaps under the supervision of the WHO.  
C Extraterritorial Criminalisation 
States can also deter organ trafficking and transplant tourism by adopting their own 
measures to govern their citizens who receive organs illegally purchased abroad, 
stopping them from doing so through extraterritorial legislation.85  
New Zealand is party to the Convention and the Protocol. In order for the provisions 
of the Protocol to have effect, they must be incorporated into domestic legislation. As 
such, the Crimes Act 1961 criminalises human trafficking, with organ removal as its 
subsidiary, in accordance with art 5 of the Protocol.86 Trafficking in people by means 
of coercion or deception is a crime under s 98D. According to s 98D(1):87 
Every one is liable to the penalty stated in subsection (2) who— 
(a) arranges the entry of a person into New Zealand or any other State by 1 or more 
acts of coercion against the person, 1 or more acts of deception of the person, or 
both; or 
Under s 98D(1)(b) having a role in the concealment and harbouring of a person who 
has been coerced under s 98D(1)(a) in New Zealand or any other state is also a 
crime.88 Proceedings may be brought even if the person coerced or deceived "did not 
in fact enter the State concerned" or "was not in fact received, concealed, or 
                                                
85  I Glenn Cohen, above n 13, at 281. 
86  Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 
2237 UNTS 319 (opened for signature 15 November 2000, entered into force 25 December 
2003), art 5. 
87  Crimes Act 1961, s 98D.  
88  Section 98D(1)(b). The full text of the provision is set out in Appendix 3. 
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harboured in the State concerned".89 Under s 98E, aggravating factors for sentencing 
include: 
• Whether the bodily harm or death occurred during the commission of the 
offence;90 
• Whether a person in respect of whom the offence was committed was subjected 
to inhuman or degrading treatment as a result of the commission of the 
offence;91 
• Whether a person in respect of whom the offence was committed was subjected 
to exploitation (for example…the removal of organs) as a result of the 
commission of the offence;92 
• Whether the person convicted committed the offence, or took actions that were 
part of it, for a material benefit.93 
The Crimes Act provisions against human trafficking have extraterritorial effect. 
Section 7A of the Crimes Act allows for extraterritorial jurisdiction of crimes with 
transnational aspects.94 Sections 98C and 98D apply to persons trafficked into "New 
Zealand or any other state".95 Under s 98F, the Attorney-General's consent to 
prosecutions in a New Zealand court for human trafficking must be obtained.96 These 
provisions target brokers who traffic individuals into New Zealand or out of New 
Zealand or any other state for the purposes of organ procurement. However they do 
not address the issue of those who travel overseas to buy an organ there and have a 
transplant at the same time. In any case, if this sort of transplant tourism takes place in 
a state where the provisions against organ sales are not enforced, it is difficult to see 
how New Zealand law can prevent New Zealand citizens from taking advantage of 
another country's system, unless a specific offence is created in New Zealand.  
Section 98D(1) criminalises human trafficking. However, the section focuses on the 
physical removal of a person from one state to another. The removal of organs is only 
an aggravating factor in the crime of human trafficking, rather than a crime in itself. 
Further, since the section targets human trafficking, it does not address situations in 
                                                
89 Section 98D(3)(a) – (b). 
90  Section 98E(1)(a). 
91  Section 98E(1)(c). 
92  Section 98E(2)(a). 
93  Section 98E(2)(c). 
94  Section 7A. 
95  Sections 98C and 98D.  
96  Section 98F. 
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which a person is offered financial reward for travelling to New Zealand to 'donate' 
their organ, nor a situation in which a New Zealander travels to another state to 
procure an organ. The Crimes Act does not adequately address the crime of organ 
trafficking as a standalone concern. If not attached to an incidence of organised crime, 
human smuggling or trafficking, it does not appear to be a crime. This means that 
although morally repugnant, facilitating organ trafficking for financial gain may go 
unchecked.  
The United Kingdom Human Tissue Act 2004 (UKHTA) specifically prohibits 
commercial dealings in human material, with an entire part of the Act dedicated to 
'Trafficking'.97 Under the UKHTA, a person commits an offence if they "give or 
receive a reward for the supply [of organs]"98 or "seeks to find a person willing to 
supply any controlled material for reward"99 or "offers to supply…for reward".100 
New Zealand, and other states, should amend their legislation using this model, and 
extend its extraterritorial provisions to cover New Zealanders who travel overseas to 
procure illegal organs, as the current general prohibition under s 56 of the Human 
Tissue Act 2008 (HTA), which states "no person may require or accept, or offer or 
provide, financial or other consideration for human tissue"101 suffers from being too 
general.  
Further, criminal responsibility should fall on medical professionals involved in the 
procedure. Medical staff involved in the follow up care of patients who have 
purchased organs should be accountable if they fail to alert authorities.102 Mandatory 
reporting requirements should be adopted for doctors who suspect the organs they 
receive for transplants are products of trafficking.103 Failing to report a suspected 
instance of organ trafficking perpetuates the cycle of exploitation. The law should 
recognise and reflect the role of doctors in the organ trafficking chain.104  
                                                
97  Human Tissue Act 2004, s 32. See Appendix 3 for the full text of this provision.   
98  Section 32(1)(a).  
99  Section 32(a)(b). 
100  Section 32(1)(c).  
101  Human Tissue Act 2008, s 56. See side by side comparison of the provisions in Appendix 3.   
102  Teagarden, above n 57, at 728 – 9.  
103  Glaser, above n 14, at 20.  
104  At 22.  
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Criminal prosecutions against members of the medical profession are rare.105 Section 
61 of the Crimes Act protects medical professionals who, in certain circumstances, 
perform surgical operations without consent, against criminal liability. Every one is 
protected from liability if the performance of the surgical operation was "reasonable" 
having regard to the circumstances, and was performed "for [the patient's] benefit".106 
Organs removal of a trafficking victim is unlikely to be "for his (or her) benefit", thus 
removing the protection of s 61. Section 61A(1) affords further protection from 
criminal liability:107 
Every one is protected from criminal responsibility for performing with reasonable 
care and skill any surgical operation upon any person if the operation is performed 
with the consent of that person, or of any person lawfully entitled to consent on his 
behalf to the operation, and for a lawful purpose. 
The definition of "lawful purpose" is neither given in this section, nor in the 
interpretation section of the Crimes Act.108 However, it is unlikely that a surgical 
operation for the purpose of removing the organ of a trafficking victim meets the 
consent requirement.109 Further, removal of organs as a consequence of human 
trafficking is a crime under s 98D(1), and is thus not a '"lawful purpose".110  
The Crimes Act arguably does impose sanctions on medical professionals who 
transplant organs procured illegally, but the sections relating to criminal responsibility 
of medical professionals are not aimed at organ trafficking, and are difficult to apply. 
New Zealand should clarify the criminal responsibility of medical professionals who 
facilitate organ trafficking.  
D  Improving the Supply and Allocation of Organs Locally 
The WHO has called for the adoption of a new paradigm, called national self-
sufficiency, that involves governments taking national-level responsibility in fulfilling 
the organ donation and transplantation needs of patients, by accessing resources from 
within the state's population.111 Further, the Declaration of Istanbul on Organ 
                                                
105  David Collins Medical Law in New Zealand (Brooker & Friend, Wellington, 1992) at [7.1.1].  
106  Crimes Act 1961, s 61. 
107  Section 61A.  
108  Section 2 is the interpretation section.  
109  See Part IID of this paper for discussion of consent. 
110  Crimes Act 1961, s 98D.  
111 World Health Organisation Human organ and tissue transplantation WHA63.22 (2010). 
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Trafficking and Transplant Tourism (the Declaration)112 encourages each state to 
strive to both ensure that programs to prevent organ failure are implemented and to 
provide organs to meet the transplant needs of its residents from donors within its 
own population. States should do so in order to avoid unethical practices of transplant 
tourism and organ trafficking arising from the global shortage of organs for 
transplantation.113 To that effect, principle 5 states:114 
Jurisdictions, countries and regions should strive to achieve self-sufficiency in organ 
donation by providing a sufficient number of organs for residents in need from 
within the country or through regional cooperation.  
The Declaration represents the standards of best practice agreed upon by participants 
of the Summit, but is not binding at international law.115  
Self-sufficiency requires comprehensive national organ procurement programmes that 
include a framework of national legislation with regulatory oversight, a programme of 
deceased donation integrated into the national health system, with resources that 
sustain the system, ethical practice of live donation that ensures donor safety, and a 
commitment to preventive medicine that will decrease the growth of patients with 
end-stage organ failure.116 Without such a change, patients will continue to seek 
illegal and unethical organ transplants in remote parts of the world but return home 
for complicated medical care.117 Each state within the international community should 
focus its resources on domestic measures instead of waiting for international law to 
respond. If each state harmonises their domestic organ procurement systems, the 
international shortage of organs will be cohesively addressed. New Zealand should 
bring its organ procurement system in line with states with proven increases in organ 
donation; that is, states with presumed consent.  
                                                
112  The Declaration was the result of the 2008 International Summit on Transplant Tourism and 
Organ Trafficking, convened by the Transplantation Society and the International Society of 
Nephrology.  
113  The Transplantation Society and International Society of Nephrology "Declaration of Istanbul on 
Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism" (declaration made at the International Summit on 
Transplant Tourism and Organ Trafficking, April 2008), Preamble.  
114  Principle 5.   
115  The 160 participants at the Summit came from across states, but did not act in an official 
capacity.  
116  F L Delmonico and others "A call for government accountability to achieve national self-
sufficiency in organ donation and transplantation" (2011) 378 The Lancet 1414 at 1414. 
117  At 1417. 
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V Proposed Domestic Solutions 
This Part will discuss and analyse proposed domestic solutions for increasing the 
supply of organs for transplantation. States should not rely on international solutions. 
States must be aware that failure to satisfy demand for organs domestically has 
international ramifications; demand and supply forces have ripple effects for the 
global organ shortage.118 It is the responsibility of individual states to counter organ 
trafficking through domestic legislation, as meeting the demand locally and legally 
disincentivises organ trafficking and transplant tourism.119 While the causal 
relationship between domestic organ donation systems and the black market in organs 
may not always be clear cut, nevertheless current systems are not fulfilling their 
potential for organ procurement. States, including New Zealand, must consider 
whether they are implicitly facilitating the black organ market.  Although many states 
express a desire to increase organ procurement, legislative action is often slow, 
occurring only in the aftermath of medical scandals.120 Ameliorating organ trafficking 
through increasing local supply should remain rooted in the theoretical arguments for 
altruism already outlined.  
Frequently discussed models for organ procurement include conscription, mandated 
choice, informed consent (or 'opt-in'), soft presumed consent, hard presumed consent 
and non-financial incentives. Both forms of presumed consent are commonly referred 
to as 'opt-out' systems. Conscription, mandated choice and both presumed consent 
variations relate only to deceased donation, while non-financial incentives may apply 
to both deceased and living donation. This paper's preferred approach is hard 
presumed consent.  
A Conscription 
Under conscription, individuals are conscripted into donation prior to death and 
organs are harvested upon death. The wishes of the decedent and their family are 
                                                
118  Williams, above n 43, at 321. 
119  Glaser, above n 14, at 21. 
120  Williams, above n 43, at 330. For example, the United Kingdom Human Tissue Act 2004 was a 
direct response to the Alder Hey hospital scandal, where over 850 organs of children were 
removed without the consent or knowledge of parents. During the Second Reading Minister for 
Health Rosie Winterton noted, "the aim of this legislation is to ensure that it will not happen 
again." 
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immaterial; the organs are simply transferred to the pool of potential recipients.121 The 
advantage of conscription is that the efficacy of cadaveric organ procurement would 
approach 100 per cent. Conscription requires neither traumatized families to make 
decisions, nor hospital staff to approach family members, thus avoiding delays that 
jeopardise the quality of organs, which occurs when seeking consent. It is less costly 
and administratively complicated, as it does not require registries or education 
campaigns.  Further, it would satisfy distributive justice because all people with 
usable organs would share the burdens as well as the benefits of organ procurement 
and transplantation; there would be no possibility of exploitation of one group for the 
benefit of another. It is an honest policy, as every citizen would know what was 
expected in terms of organ transplantation.122 
However, a conscription system carries strongly coercive connotations. Public 
opposition would be difficult to overcome. Conscription entirely rejects the principle 
of informed consent.  Conscription not only ignores consent, it shifts the rationale for 
organ donation from gift to duty, thereby rejecting the theoretical underpinnings that 
this paper considers the appropriate underlying motivation for organ donation. 
Compulsory donation is a contradiction; the nature of donation is not compatible with 
state coercion.123 
B Mandated Choice 
Mandated choice requires all citizens to make a definitive decision as to whether to 
become an organ donor, and register their choice on a national registry. The 
infringement on personal autonomy is only to the extent that citizens would be 
required by the state to make a decision. The benefits of mandated choice systems 
include the enhancement of individual autonomy since each person's actual wishes 
would be known and followed. This system would also eliminate the loss of organs 
through procrastination, because people would be required to confront the issue of 
their own deaths earlier. However, mandated choice would have to be implemented in 
                                                
121  Andrew C MacDonald "Organ Donation: The Time Has Come to Refocus the Ethical Spotlight" 
(1997) 8 Stan L & Pol'y Rev 177 at 181. 
122  Aaron Spital "Conscription of Cadaveric Organs for Transplantation: Neglected Again" (2003) 13 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics J 169 at 171. 
123  Judith Sander "Organ Donation in New Zealand – A Reform Proposal for the Human Tissue Act 
2008" (LLM Research Essay, Victoria University of Wellington, 2011) at 11. 
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conjunction with operational changes within the medical community.124 Medical staff 
would have to ensure that the decedent's expressed wishes were followed, instead of 
obtaining family consent, which is the default response of many medical 
professionals. Otherwise the number of organs that would be available under 
mandated choice would be depleted by some of the same forces that frustrate the opt-
in system.  
Mandated choice is a middle ground between opt-in systems and opt-out systems. The 
fact that the state requires a decision is arguably less problematic than presuming 
consent unless an objection has been registered. It may be argued that presumed 
consent systems prey on the apathetic, whereas mandated consent only requires the 
apathetic to make a one decision.  However, this paper considers that presumed 
consent is preferable; while it involves many of the same institutional changes that 
mandated choice requires, such as developing a register, presumed consent goes a 
step further, in changing the culture of organ donation.  The problem with mandated 
choice is that it forces a decision at one particular point, such as when a person is 
filling out a hospital form or applying for a driver's licence. At this point, the decision 
may not be fully considered. If this decision is later seen as binding, it also preys on 
the apathetic; those who do not engage with the process or do prior research and 
instead simply tick a box. Mandated choice does nothing to change the motivations of 
would-be organ donors and may not necessarily convince people to donate their 
organs for altruistic purposes. It merely pressures them to make a decision.125 On the 
other hand, presumed consent may catalyse a significant shift in organ donation 
culture, and has proven to increase organ donation rates. 
C Opt-In 
The default system for many states is the opt-in system. Opt-in means that an 
individual must actively express an informed wish to donate – to 'opt-in'. New 
Zealand's current opt-in system is detailed in Part VII. The term 'opt-in' is often used 
interchangeably with informed consent. However, this paper considers that this is a 
misuse of the informed consent principle. Opt-in systems may not always give effect 
to an individual's wishes. A fully realised system of informed consent would employ a 
                                                
124  Macdonald, above n 121, at 183. 
125  Amitai Etzioni "Organ Donation: A Communitarian Approach" (2003) 13 Kennedy Institute of 
Ethics J 1 at 2. 
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national "opt-in" register. Everyone would be required to make an informed decision 
about whether he or she wanted to become a donor if the circumstances arose and 
have it recorded and witnessed in a legally binding way. Under such a system, the 
family's wishes should not play a role, as the donors themselves would have made 
their own decisions in advance. The organisational obstacle to a fully effective 
informed consent system is that it is impractical to require everyone to make choices 
in advance and then efficiently keep track of those decisions.126 In practice, opt-in 
systems default to the wishes of family members. The informed consent of the 
deceased may not be respected at all. For opt-in to be effective, first the deceased 
must have expressed a wish either to donate or not and have made recorded this wish 
in writing, or expressed it clearly to their family. Secondly, medical professionals 
must be informed of such a wish and be prepared to carry it out, even if the family 
objects. In practice, this is often not the case, as medical professionals may be 
reluctant to ignore the wishes of the family during a traumatic time. The ineffective 
and inconsistent application of the so-called 'informed consent' system is a key factor 
in the failure of states, including New Zealand, to procure organs for transplantation.  
D Non-financial incentives 
Short of paying potential donors for organs, another approach is to offer non-financial 
incentives. Examples of non-financial incentives are preferential access to organs for 
the donor or the donor's family, recognition of the donation, or funeral expenses 
(which are arguably non-financial as they are not given directly in exchange for an 
organ). A New Zealand example of a non-financial incentive is the non-profit 
organisation LifeSharers New Zealand, in which members promise to donate their 
organs upon death and give fellow members first access to their organs.127 By offering 
organs to other organ donors first, an incentive for non-donors to become donors is 
created.128 Non-financial incentives escape the accusations of market exploitation by 
falling just short of controversial financial exchange for organs. However, the 
potential donor is still making an exchange for their donation, defeating the altruistic 
basis for organ procurement.  
                                                
126  Kieran Healy "Do Presumed Consent Laws Raise Organ Procurement Rates?" (2006) 55 DePaul 
L Rev 1017 at 1022. 
127  LifeSharers New Zealand "How LifeSharers Works" <lifesharers.org.nz>. 
128  LifeSharers New Zealand "How LifeSharers Works" <lifesharers.org.nz>. 
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E Presumed Consent 
Presumed consent is an 'opt-out' system applying to deceased donations that presumes 
everyone is a donor unless they take affirmative steps to register their objection to 
organ donation. There are two types of presumed consent systems: 'soft' presumed 
consent and 'hard' presumed consent. Hard presumed consent systems are more likely 
to increase organ supplies to meet demand. The wishes of the deceased's family are 
neither considered nor requested in a hard presumed consent system.  In soft 
presumed consent systems, the wishes of the family may be taken into account, and 
may be determinative, regardless of the deceased's wishes.129 Soft presumed consent 
systems are in essence the same as opt-in systems because the family may still 
object.130 Many European states have a system of presumed consent, including 
France, Spain, Austria, Italy, Sweden and Belgium.131 In Belgium less than 2 per cent 
of the population has elected to opt-out, which they may do by registering their 
objection at any town hall.132 
There are three ways that presumed consent might be associated with higher 
procurement rates. First, hard presumed consent laws allows for all potential donors 
who have not registered an objection to become real donors, with no loss due to 
refusals by family members. Timing is critically important to organ and tissue 
harvesting; most viable tissues require harvesting within three to six hours of death.133 
So long as the deceased donor has not registered an objection, hard presumed consent 
allows transplant to proceed without waiting for other possible objections.134 
However, almost all countries with presumed consent laws have soft presumed 
consent, allowing family members to be consulted. Austria is the only true hard 
presumed consent system.135 However, even soft presumed consent may increase 
                                                
129  Statz, above n 18, at 1690.  
130  Glaser, above n 14, at 21. 
131  Alberto Abadie and Sebastien Gay "The impact of presumed consent legislation on cadaveric 
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organ donations, because presumed consent laws function as a signalling device to the 
population in general and family members in particular. Having a presumed consent 
law shifts the question facing donors and their families. Rather than being asked, 
"Can we have your permission to go ahead?" families are instead asked, "Do you have 
any reason to think the donor would have objected?"136 This is a small but significant 
shift. In terms of public opinion, presumed consent would express a social norm or 
expectation about the default course of action. Donation is still a choice, but saying 
"yes" is assumed to be the standard option, rather than a special decision for which 
consent must be specially sought. Family members are no longer the default decision-
makers137 and the decision as to whether or not to donate organs is not made during 
the grieving period immediately following death.138  Finally, presumed consent laws 
lead to higher procurement rates because they require effective registration systems 
and are associated with better institutional practices.  Rather than being a causal force 
in themselves, presumed consent systems may simply be markers for other practices 
that make organ procurement more efficient.139  
The overwhelming objection to presumed consent is that it infringes on individual 
autonomy and goes against the fundamental medical principle of informed consent. 
This objection assumes that an individual has no autonomy or choice in the matter at 
all; that organs will be procured by the state in all circumstances. In fact, the 
presumed consent system is a stronger indicator of a potential donor's wishes. If a 
person is strongly opposed to donation, presumably they would take the steps to opt-
out, signaling to their family their wishes. In an opt-in system, apathy is rampant, and 
family members are often unable to make quick decisions at the hospital. Although 
soft presumed consent may in practice be similar to opt-in systems, the culture created 
by having to opt-out arguably allows for more consistent implementation of the 
potential donor's wishes.  
The terminology used to describe presumed consent is confusing. Presumed consent 
is commonly described as 'opt-out' and is contrasted to 'opt-in' systems, which is used 
interchangeably with informed consent. Such terminology appears to place presumed 
consent at irreconcilable odds with informed consent. However, so long as presumed 
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consent is implemented alongside factors to be discussed below, such as public 
education and institutional safeguards, a potential donor will still receive all the 
information concerning the process of organ transplantation required for the donor to 
make an informed decision. Informed consent is still present in the decision not to 
opt-out; and as a corollary, if an individual does choose to opt-out, they will be 
provided with all the information necessary to make an informed objection.  
Fears that presumed consent preys on the apathetic can be allayed if states that adopt 
presumed consent systems simultaneously commit to public education campaigns. 
The option to object to organ donation should be made clear to citizens; this would 
also ensure that family are aware that the donor made an informed decision to 
donate.140 Another way to ameliorate potential infringement on an individual's choice 
to donate organs is through creating specific national bodies to regulate and provide 
easily accessible processes for opting out. If anything, presumed consent (particularly 
hard presumed consent) allows for increased personal freedom because it makes sure 
that an individual's wishes are actually carried out, rather than circumvented by the 
family's choices.141 Presumed consent has been criticised for assuming that organs 
belong to the state or society rather than to individuals or families. However, properly 
understood, presumed consent merely shifts the presumption about an individual's 
wishes in the absence of express statement of those wishes, after adequate opportunity 
for objection is given.142  
VI Presumed Consent in Practice 
At first glance, a comparison of presumed consent states to non-presumed consent 
states reveals that states following presumed consent models have higher levels of 
donation. Austria, a presumed consent state, shows higher rates of organ donation 
than Germany, a non-presumed consent state, even though their cultures are very 
similar.143 However, factors that affect presumed consent and may significantly 
influence donation rates include the presence (or lack) of institutional processes, the 
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role of the family, public education and cultural and religious factors.144 The next 
Parts discuss factors influencing the successful implementation of presumed consent. 
The role of culture is discussed in detail in the New Zealand section.  
A Institutional Processes  
A national register is fundamental to the success of presumed consent. The arguments 
against presumed consent can only be countered if a register in is place that records 
each individual's informed objection to donation. The register would only need to 
record opt-outs, as everyone else is presumed to consent to donation. Thus, concerns 
about the costliness of maintaining a nationwide register would be alleviated; as such 
a register does not require records of a state's whole population.  
Secondly, optimising deceased organ donation requires a central structure of 
transplant organisations or specifically trained hospital staff to be involved in the 
process. Donation is more likely to occur when the request for donation is made by 
trained staff, as can be seen in the Spanish example below.  
Thirdly, the number of beds in an intensive care unit (ICU) of hospitals may impact 
organ procurement. Deceased donors are declared brain dead while their body and 
vital organs are supported by artificial means.145 The number of deceased donors 
eligible for donation depends upon the capacity of ICUs. Increasing intensive care 
facilities means that hospitals are open to more potential deceased donors. There are 
comparatively few intensive care beds in New Zealand, due to the practice of limiting 
intensive care if patients are considered to have a poor prognosis, to avoid blocking 
beds for patients more likely to benefit from intensive care. This restricts the donation 
rate.146 However, this practice could be changed to reflect a change in policy with 
presumed consent.  
1 Spain  
Spain provides an illuminating example of the significance of institutional processes. 
Spain is frequently cited as an example of successful presumed consent. Spain has 
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had a presumed consent system for organ donation since 1979. A recent report notes 
that organ donations have increased by 142 per cent since 1989.147 The organ 
donation rate for deceased donors in 2011 was 35.1 per million people.148 Reports of 
the Spanish case suggest that improved donation rates are due to substantial 
investment in the logistics of organ procurement, better training, clear delegation of 
responsibility and a strong presence in hospitals, rather than simply a change in the 
legal structure of donation or a wholesale change in public opinion.149  
A multi-layered coordination network is the basis for the Spanish model. Spain has 
developed a network of transplant coordinators across 139 ICUs.150 The trained 
transplant coordinators are physicians who are part of the in-house staff of the 
hospital, but are completely independent from the transplant team. They play an 
active part in coordinating all aspects of the organ donation process, particularly in 
discussing organ donation with the family of the deceased, taking away the burden of 
organ procurement from the transplant surgeons.151 The professional skills and 
training of these coordinators are a key part of this model.152 Spain has developed a 
policy of 'active detection'. Active detection means that trained transplant 
coordinators visit emergency rooms and ICUs on a daily basis, checking the status of 
patients, and identifying potential donors. The coordinators also discuss the donation 
process with families. A survey by Spanish researchers found that of 200 families 
who originally objected to donation, 78 per cent changed their minds after speaking 
with a transplant coordinator.153 There are no financial incentives for transplant 
coordinators to identify potential donors or to increase the donor rate from their 
hospital.154 
The Spanish example highlights the fact that dynamic growth in procurement rates is 
the result of a presumed consent system coupled with infrastructural investment and 
organisational reform. Spain stands out not because it offers incentives for donors or 
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their families but because of its presumed consent system, accompanied by effective 
institutional processes that encourage increased altruistic donation.155 
2 Brazil   
In contrast to Spain, Brazil is an example of a failed presumed consent system. In 
January 1998, Brazil enacted a law declaring all adults potential organ donors unless 
they filed for an exemption, but did not have the resources to implement any of 
Spain's institutional structures.156 In October 1998, the Brazilian government repealed 
the presumed consent law, in response to opposition from the Brazilian Medical 
Association, the Federal Council of Medicine and the general public.157 The law was 
ineffective because most doctors were unwilling to harvest organs against the wishes 
of family members even though the law required them to do so. The lack of 
infrastructure needed to maintain the intended register of recipients, as well as the 
inability to transport the organs between hospitals all contributed to the failure of the 
system in Brazil.158 Without support from medical organisations and against a 
background of public distrust of the government and negative media reports, the 
Brazilian presumed consent system could not stand.159  
The problem in Brazil stemmed from incompetent administration and lack of 
infrastructure rather than a defect in the law itself.160 The case studies of Spain and 
Brazil offer salutary lessons for the implementation of a presumed consent system in 
New Zealand, showing the importance of institutional safeguards and infrastructure.   
B Role of Family 
The role of family members complicates both presumed consent and informed 
consent systems. As already discussed, if almost all presumed consent systems in fact 
allow the family to refuse consent for donation, they are the same as opt-in systems 
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and the change in law allowing medical staff to override the wishes of families during 
donation will have minimal effect on increasing procurement rates.161 
The question of whether the family of a deceased person should be granted the right 
to veto the deceased's decision to become an organ donor is a controversial one, not 
least in the New Zealand context. The first draft of the Human Tissue Bill 2006 
contained the right of families to override the deceased's wishes in exceptional 
circumstances. This was removed from the final version of the HTA.162 Families often 
refuse to give consent because they are not sure of the deceased person's wishes. 
However, if the wishes of the deceased are known, the family's decision is typically 
consistent with the recorded wish.163 
Common misconceptions or psychological barriers often drive refusal to donate when 
the family is approached. Misconceptions include a family's fear of inadequate 
healthcare provided to donors and general avoidance of thinking about death. The 
primary psychological barrier is the traumatic experience of losing a family member; 
this can prevent the family from making an informed, rational decision regarding 
organs.164 A family is more likely to agree to donate if misconceptions are dispelled 
through public education and campaigns that facilitate discussions among family 
members. 
C Public Education 
An essential element of any organ donation system is public education. Public 
education must go hand in hand with presumed consent. Public education 
encompasses both specific information about how the organ donation system works, 
and more generally the benefits of altruistic organ donation. In the latter case, more 
generalised public education about altruistic donation may also function as an 
independent mechanism for encouraging increased organ donations. Public education 
also increases public confidence in the healthcare system, which in turn may 
encourage more donations. Governments should be actively involved in promoting 
and financing public education to provide their citizens with a better chance of 
receiving organ transplants.  
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On a specific level, public education raises awareness about the workings of the 
presumed consent system, and how an individual can register their objections if they 
wish. On a general level, public education seeks to increase organ donation by 
improving public awareness of transplantation and of the need for organ donation so 
that individuals will be consider donating and talk to their family members about 
organ donation. Hospitals and government health ministries should work to produce a 
public understanding of why donation is worthwhile.165  An important aspect of high 
donor states is a culture where donation is the norm and the expectation that someone 
will donate is shared throughout the community.166 A culture of donation ameliorates 
the ethical concerns suffered by presumed consent; it is not seen as coercive and 
unethical if the community already considers donating to be the norm and expects to 
have to take extra steps to opt-out. This may incorporate educating in schools from a 
young age. Education programmes for young persons should highlight the fact that 
organ donation is an act people engage in altruistically because they consider it their 
social responsibility, akin to volunteering.167 It is important to design programmes 
that encourage conversation between family members from a young age, as well as 
informing people about the importance of organ donation. Such discussions are 
critical and have implications for all involved in the organ donation process, 
regardless of the characteristics of the organ donation system in which they are 
involved.168 
Education must also extend to health professionals.  The promotion of learning from 
one another and increasing adequacy of training to all professionals involved in the 
promotion of organ donation should be a priority of this international cooperation. 
The organisational approaches of areas with high donation rates need to be studied 
carefully. Educational programmes should be established where the staff from high 
procurement areas are used to train individuals from areas of lower procurement.169 
Approaches and attitudes of hospital staff are important in organ donation. A goal of 
hospital education and development should be to encourage hospital staff to take 
ownership of the process to help support organ donation from within the hospital.  
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California provides an example of a successful public education campaign. Donate 
Life California launched a broad education campaign in 2005 with the aim of lifting 
organ donation rates. Its listed aims were to:170 
• Redefine and reposition organ donation as a public health problem for 
Californians; 
• Educate the public and media about the lack of organ donors; 
• Spread awareness using community collaboration and media advocacy 
strategies and; 
• Adopt a single call to action compelling Californians to become organ 
donors by registering online.  
The strategy hinged upon providing information to hospitals, families of potential 
organ donors, and the community. More than 175,000 new donors joined the online 
registry during the first 6 months of the campaign.171  
In order to truly give effect to presumed consent, this paper argues first, that states 
should implement hard presumed consent rather than soft presumed consent, and 
secondly, there must be a shift in medical practice. Medical professionals should first 
consult the stated wishes of the deceased, rather than going straight to the family. 
Such a shift requires effective institutional processes, including a national register and 
directed public education, with a focus on encouraging conversations amongst 
families about organ donation.  
VII Can Presumed Consent Work in New Zealand? 
The Human Tissue Act 2008 (HTA) specifically legislates for informed consent in 
human tissue and organ donation in New Zealand, replacing the Human Tissue Act 
1964. Under s 19(1)(a), collection or use of human tissue that is collected from a body 
must be done with informed consent.172 Under s 31, informed consent may be given 
by before death by the individual from whose body the tissue is collected, the 
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individual's nominee, a member of their immediate family or a close relative.173 
Informed consent for the collection or use of human tissue is defined as consent:174 
(a) to that kind of collection or use of the tissue (and so does not include agreement 
in general terms, given by an applicant for, or holder of, a driver licence, to that 
applicant or holder being an organ donor); and 
(b) given by a person who is entitled to give it under subpart 3; and 
(c) given freely, and in the light of all information that a reasonable person, in that 
person’s circumstances, needed in order to give informed consent. 
There is currently no presumption in New Zealand that the deceased will be an organ 
donor; there must be explicit consent on the part of the donor, in a will or an advance 
directive, or made orally in the presence of two witnesses.175 A common 
misconception is that being listed as a 'donor' on a New Zealand driver's licence 
constitutes consent to donation. In fact, that is not legally binding. In the absence of a 
will or advance directive, or witnessed oral statement, consent to donation defaults to 
the family members.176 
While the Human Tissue Bill 2006 (HTB) was before the House of Representatives, a 
concurrent bill, the Human Tissue (Organ Donation) Amendment Bill 2006 (Organ 
Donation Bill) was also being heard. The Organ Donation Bill, a private members' 
bill that proposed a national organ donation registry, did not pass its second reading. 
The Health Committee considered the HTB sufficient to regulate organ donation 
matters. Thus the HTA is the only governing statute for cadaveric organ donation in 
New Zealand. It is worth noting that the HTA primarily regulates cadaveric donation, 
although the s 56 provision against exchange of organs for financial gain applies to 
both deceased and living donation.177 It is interesting to note that in the debates 
around both bills, opt-in was the dominant approach to organ donation; in fact, 
presumed consent was not discussed at all. The next Part discusses the matters 
considered by the House in the process of debating the two bills. The matters 
discussed offer insight into the main concerns in organ donation in New Zealand. 
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A Human Tissue (Organ Donation) Amendment Bill 2006 
The main proposal of the bill was a national organ register. The register was to take 
the form of an opt-in register for individuals to indicate which organs they wish to 
donate, and whether the organs would be used for therapeutic use or for medical 
educational research. The register would record objections for individuals to register a 
clear instruction not to donate in any circumstances. Most significantly, the bill 
allowed for the wishes of the donor to be paramount, with binding legal status.178  
In introducing the bill, MP Jackie Blue noted:179  
Importantly, provision is also made for public education regarding organ 
donation. Countries with established organ donor registers that have resulted in 
an increase in organ donors link their success directly to education and publicity. 
Blue also highlighted the persistent calls for change and the dropping organ donation 
rates in New Zealand, noting that in 2002 Andy Tookey and 1,169 others presented a 
petition to Parliament that requested a review of organ donation practices. The Health 
Committee tabled reports in November 2003 and October 2004 that requested urgent 
action to improve New Zealand’s organ donor shortage and provided information on 
how an organ donor register might work, but no further reform materialised.180  
The bill faced resistance on two fronts: first, there was debate as to the efficacy of a 
national register and secondly, concern that the bill's focus on the individual's wishes 
would not reflect tikanga Māori. The importance of incorporating tikanga Māori was 
acknowledged in the bill. The role of whānau was highlighted in the organ donation 
process.181 The Māori perspective was further emphasised by Tariana Turia, who 
stated:182 
Human tissue organ donation is a massive issue for us, and it raises huge 
questions about issues of protection, informed consent, tangata whenua control 
of information and medical processes, access to information and medical care, 
and, most of all, cultural respect. 
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Despite the strong support for amendment of the organ donation system and concern 
for dropping organ rates, the Health Committee recommended that the bill not be 
passed, noting that compelling evidence for a legally binding register was not 
available at this time. However, the Committee recommended the inclusion of a 
clause in the Government’s Human Tissue Bill to permit the establishment of an opt-
in organ and tissue donor register, should the evidence make that a desirable course in 
the future. The Committee acknowledged that evidence did point to increased public 
awareness about organ and tissue donation, improvements in processes around 
donation, and improvements in coordination between agencies as being most likely to 
lead to improvements in donation rates. The Committee considered that Organ 
Donation New Zealand had sufficient initiatives under way in this area.183  
B Human Tissue Bill 2006 
The HTB provided a framework for regulating the collection, storage, and use of 
tissues and organs, primarily from the deceased as well as regulating trade in tissue, 
export and import of tissue, and the use of tissue for non-therapeutic purposes—for 
example, audit, research, and post-mortem.184 The bill also clarified the consent 
framework for organ and tissue donation, especially the role of family members in 
giving consent.185 The stated purpose of the bill was to make informed consent the 
fundamental principle underpinning the lawful collection and use of human tissue 
from deceased people, to ensure that autonomy and dignity of the individual is 
respected, as well as cultural and spiritual needs.186 The bill allows for both informed 
consent and informed objection.187 
The HTB passed into law, without providing for a national organ registry. The HTA 
includes a provision for future implementation of a national register, which to date 
has not materialised.188 The fact that the Organ Donation Bill did not pass a second 
reading offers a pessimistic outlook for presumed consent in New Zealand. If an opt-
in register could not gain the support of Parliament it appears unlikely that an opt-out 
system could ever gain the support of Parliament. Although the two bills discussed 
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above indicate the difficulty of implementing presumed consent in New Zealand, the 
system is still worthy of consideration, for the reasons already discussed. New 
Zealand is implicated in the organ shortage through its low numbers of organ 
donators. The shortage may be even more problematic than it appears at first glance, 
because transplantation waitlists in New Zealand do not reflect the true number of 
patients in need of organs. Many people whose bodies have deteriorated past the point 
of being healthy enough to receive an organ are removed from the waitlist.189 There 
remains a pressing need to address the issue of organ shortages in New Zealand, 
which the HTA does not adequately address. 
The HTA creates a strong framework for physicians and organ procurement 
specialists to obtain informed consent and thus uphold individual autonomy, but fails 
to create a way to provide this consent easily. It is difficult for hospital staff in an 
emergency situation to ascertain whether consent has been given orally in the 
presence of witnesses or through a will or advance directive.190 Without an easy way 
for someone to create binding informed consent or select a nominee, the law leaves 
organ procurement staff to sort through complicated family structures to discover 
whether someone capable has provided the proper consent.191 If any member of the 
family objects, the transplant surgeon will not go ahead with the organ removal. It is 
unlikely that a hospital staff will sort through who has higher priority for decision-
making based on the HTA, especially as organ donation has a time limit.192  
A medical professional who collects organs without the appropriate informed consent 
may face fines or imprisonment. However, should the professional refuse to take an 
organ for any reason, even if informed consent has been given they are protected. 
This tips the scale against taking organs should a physician believe there could be a 
claim that informed consent was not properly obtained or that a valid objection has 
been raised.193 As the HTA provides no means of registering the wish to donate, it 
allows organ donation rates to stagnate. This does nothing to combat the international 
organ shortage, and does not fulfil New Zealand's responsibilities of reducing organ 
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trafficking through self-sufficiency. New Zealand should implement a presumed 
consent system. 
C A  Presumed Consent Framework for New Zealand  
1 Māori perspectives  
The HTB and Organ Donation Bill debates highlight the key consideration of tikanga 
Māori. It is essential to consider Māori perspectives on deceased and living organ 
donation in implementing a presumed consent system in New Zealand. The Treaty of 
Waitangi underpins the provision of health services to Māori. The Treaty partnership 
requires that Māori be able to protect their cultural practices and their tikanga and 
participate fully in NZ society as Māori. The principle of partnership under the Treaty 
must be given effect in health policy development.194 It should be noted that Māori 
beliefs are not uniform; traditional Māori beliefs vary among iwi and many Māori are 
detached from traditional beliefs. There is no one reality, nor is there any longer a 
single definition which will encompass the range of Māori lifestyles. In considering 
policies for Māori health, the diverse realities of Māori must be taken into account.195 
Presumed consent for organ donation directly impacts on the Māori worldview, as 
explained by Pita Sharples, speaking to the Organ Donation Bill:196  
The concepts associated with burial—the connection between birth and death—the 
healing, grieving, and cultural practices of iwi Māori, are deeply steeped in the 
sense of sanctity, of tapu and kawa…they are concepts that are essential in any 
discussion around organ donation, strategies to enhance health and well-being, renal 
disease, and the collection and use of human tissue. These issues are more than that 
of an individual signing a register to either confirm or object to the opportunity to be 
an organ donor. It is a collective process for Māori; one that is absorbed into the 
process of whānau decision-making.  
 
In the Committee stage for the HTB the Māori Party proposed that families be given 
the power to veto the consent given by Māori individuals while they were alive. 
Although it was considered appropriate that cultural issues be considered during the 
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organ donation process, it was not felt to be appropriate to give families a legal right 
to override an individual decision.197 However, the HTA requires the person 
collecting human organs or tissue to take into account cultural and spiritual needs.198 
Presumed consent legislation in New Zealand should honour this provision. 
According to a Te Puni Kōkiri report, Māori both donate and receive proportionally 
fewer organs than non-Māori.199 Māori are under-represented in donation statistics, 
while at the same time being more likely to need organ donation. The report notes that 
the rate of Māori dying from kidney related disease is four times that of non-Māori.200  
Lewis and Pickering suggest that one possible explanation for the discrepancy 
between Māori and non-Māori organ donation rates are spiritual beliefs of Māori, 
particularly as relating to death and dying.201  From a spiritual point of view, 
traditional Māori beliefs offer fundamental reasons for not donating organs – 
including the adverse impact that organ donation may have upon donors and their 
whānau and the adverse impact that receiving a donated organ may have upon 
recipients and their whānau.202 The overarching belief is that not to burying an 
individual whole would be seen as breaking the cycle of life back to Papatuanuku. All 
life is derived from the earth, and to return an individual to the earth with organs 
missing introduces incompleteness, leaving an unfulfilled process from birth to death, 
a cycle which is tapu.203  
As reflected in the holistic approach of traditional Māori society, ramifications of 
organ donation for the individual donor also become implications for the whānau as a 
whole.204 The individual's body is seen as the physical manifestation of whakapapa.205 
Previous generations culminate in the physical body of a person, which is only a link 
in the chain of whakapapa extending into the past and the future. To have parts of the 
body living on outside the body has ramifications for the ancestral line and harms the 
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whānau as a whole.206 Allowing individuals to be the sole decision-makers of 
whakapapa does not allow for the collective involvement of whānau.207 
On the part of the recipient there are also matters to consider. Whakapapa is of 
importance; with a foreign organ in the body, recipients are no longer made up of the 
material only of their tipuna or ancestors. For some recipients, this may create a 
feeling of alienation from whānau, iwi and tipuna. The bloodline of the whānau may 
be perceived as diluted or contaminated.208 Moreover, organ donation tears at the 
fabric of tapu, as seeking to retain the life of an individual by the removal of organs 
from someone who has died creates an interplay between the living and the dead that 
may upset the spiritual order.209 The spark of life is transferred through human will 
and not by divine order. These considerations may be great enough to outweigh the 
benefits of donating or accepting organs.210 
As far as living donation is concerned, the intermingling of whakapapa remains a 
concern. However, living donation within a whānau may be more acceptable for some 
Māori as the donation is unlikely to be anonymous and uncertainty about ancestral 
lineage is removed.211 
There is a wide range of views and attitudes about transplantation and donation within 
the Māori community and a blanket refusal to donate should not be assumed.  
Individual circumstances equally influence decisions, and all options must be 
explained to patients in the context of clear and understandable information about the 
realities of organ failure. The communication skills and cultural competence of 
transplant team members are critical in dispelling inaccuracies and improving 
outcomes for the Māori community in New Zealand.212 Any system of presumed 
consent in New Zealand must recognise cultural perspectives and provide processes 
for giving effect to cultural differences.   
                                                
206  At 33. 
207  Human Tissue Bill 2006 (82 – 2) (select committee report) at 8, per the Māori Party minority 
view. 
208  Lewis and Pickering, above n 201, at 34.  
209  At 34. 
210  At 34. 
211  At 35. 
212  Mauri Ora Associates Māori Pacific Attitudes Towards Transplantation: Professional 
Perspectives (Ministry of Health, October 2009) at 4. 
Reducing Organ Trafficking: New Zealand's International and Domestic Responsibilities 
 
 45
The same factors discussed in Part VI are applicable in the New Zealand context. The 
involvement of whānau is recognised as a crucial part of improving Māori health and 
well-being – thus education programmes and information must be developed for both 
Māori and their whānau about organ donation and organ transplantation. Māori 
patients and their whānau considering organ donation should be given as much 
support and time as they require to understand the concept of presumed consent and 
to reach an informed decision, collectively. Presumed consent gives effect to the 
wishes of the individual, but this does not mean that the individual should not be 
encouraged to discuss their choice with their family. Education programmes should 
encourage dialogue with whānau, so that communities can be confident that the 
individual's views are shared and understood by the collective family. Advanced skills 
for critical care professionals can be improved by training for interacting with 
grieving families with cultural sensitivity.213 If health care information is 
communicated in a way that is perceived by Māori as sensitive to their cultural beliefs 
and values, the likelihood of understanding, treatment compliance and improved 
outcomes are more assured.214 
It is also important that recipients of body parts are offered an opportunity of 
culturally accepting the transplant, for example by having a karakia over the donated 
organ. This is an integral part of cultural acceptance of a transplant.215 Transplant staff 
should be prepared to address the entire whānau present, allow time for the whānau to 
discuss the issue by themselves without clinical staff present, offer to make a referral 
to the Māori chaplain, offer to make a referral to Whānau Care Services for a Māori 
advocate to provide support or to facilitate hui and to explain to whānau the presumed 
consent system.216 
The reference group for the Te Puni Kōkiri report on organ donation commented "one 
hundred years ago there were no options for Māori. This is all new, Māori are 
beginning to look at the donation as taonga."217 Donation can be seen as a gift of life 
and many patients, including Māori experience increased well-being and quality of 
life after receiving a transplant. The key to implementing a successful system of 
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presumed consent in New Zealand is by respecting cultural differences through clear 
dialogue and respecting the need for whānau input. Accordingly, targeted education 
programmes, and communication skills and cultural competence of transplant team 
members, will be critical in dispelling inaccuracies about presumed consent and 
improving organ transplantation outcomes for the Māori community.218 
2 Deceased donation opt-out registry 
Presumed consent must be paired with an opt-out registry, in order to protect 
individual autonomy, to allow those who wish to opt-out may do so and to ensure 
public confidence in the system. Pairing a national registry with a presumed consent 
system will increase the rate of organ donation in New Zealand and flow into the 
solution for organ trafficking. The systems will work concurrently to address the 
limitations that exist were either system to be instituted in isolation.219 To institute the 
registry, New Zealand will need to engage in a national awareness campaign to 
educate the public on the new registry and the option to opt-out and prepare them to 
make a legally binding decision. Informed consent will be achieved through public 
education.220 
The national registry would provide an easy way to register and record legally binding 
objection, while respecting individual autonomy and the cultural and spiritual needs 
of the family. The implementation of a register is already provided for in law under s 
78 of the HTA.221 Setting up a register would not require significant policy change. 
The Health Committee was concerned about underutilisation, fearing that the high 
cost of instituting the registry would not be countered by a higher donation rate.222 
This concern would be addressed under presumed consent coupled with widespread 
public education as to the mandatory nature of the presumption, as it would call for all 
New Zealanders to make a decision as to whether to opt-out. One practical suggestion 
for making sure the register is utilised is by requiring New Zealanders to consider 
whether they wish to opt-out and including an information box about how to do so on 
tax return forms223 or on electoral forms.224 After New Zealanders register an 
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objection to donation it would be entered onto the national registry and would be 
available to hospitals and organ procurement staff. At any point, an individual could 
change their mind about either opting-out or chose to opt-out by contracting the 
registry directly.225 An individual could also update their choice at the next 
opportunity for filing a tax form or filling out an electoral form. The reason why 
donation rates are so low is largely due to apathy – many people are simply waiting 
for someone to pose the question.226 Presumed consent accompanied by a register 
removes the question while at the same time providing an uncomplicated and legally 
binding way for individuals to register their objection; thereby giving effect to 
informed consent. 
Public education is of particular pertinence in implementing presumed consent in 
New Zealand, first because of the importance of creating culturally appropriate 
education campaigns for Māori, and secondly, because the lack of action for public 
education was of particular concern during the debates for the HTB and the Organ 
Donation Bill. NZ First noted, "without a [public marketing] campaign, organ 
donation will always remain in the too-hard basket".227 The current HTA neither 
increases organ donation rates, nor provides a way to register consent, even though it 
purports to uphold informed consent. A system based on a two-step approach of 
general public education and comprehensive information about the presumed consent 
system and how to opt-out at the time of decision-making would form the basis of 
informed consent as required by the HTA and the Code of Health and Disability 
Services Consumers' Rights.228  
Further, during the debates it was affirmed "the very last thing New Zealanders would 
want to occur is financial consideration for human tissue or human organs…the gift 
status these donations have been accorded must remain."229 Thus the New Zealand 
system remains rooted in altruism. Although presumed consent was not mentioned as 
an option, some Members of Parliament did emphasise the need to "continue to think 
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laterally and creatively around what possibilities we may not have yet explored for 
improving donor rates within New Zealand."230 Presumed consent is one such 
possibility. Not only will such a system contribute on a domestic level to decreasing 
the demand for trafficked organs, it will also yield huge savings. Kidney dialysis 
imposes health care costs on the New Zealand public health system. There is a 
monetary incentive in improving organ donation rates, particularly of kidney 
donations.231 
It is acknowledged that imposing presumed consent immediately might not be 
acceptable to the general public. This paper suggests that a middle ground may lie in 
first implementing an opt-in register under s 78, coupled with a public education 
campaign about presumed consent. In two years' time, the register may gradually be 
converted to an opt-out register, in which those who have already opted-in will be 
asked whether they wish to remain so, everyone else who does not register an 
objection will be presumed to be donors. Speaking for her Organ Donation Bill Blue 
noted:232  
Some countries have presumed consent registers where everyone is presumed to be 
a donor and must physically opt off if they do not wish to be. I urge all members not 
to invent the wheel but to let all those countries that do well in organ donation 
become our model for a better system that would not only respect individuals’ 
wishes and be kinder to grieving families but would save the lives of those who 
would die needlessly. 
3 Living donation  
Living organ donation will remain the same under the proposed change to presumed 
consent. Living donations in New Zealand are governed by the Code, and the 
principle of informed consent. However, this paper has proposed amendments to the 
HTA and the Crimes Act, which will clarify that living organ donations for financial 
gain are prohibited.233 The public education campaigns accompanying a move to 
presumed consent may also increase living organ donation, through developing a 
culture of increased organ donations. Live Organ Donor Assistance, in the form of 
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income assistance and childcare costs, is currently available to living donors who 
altruistically donate kidney or liver tissue for transplantation purposes.234 This 
assistance covers some loss of income and any extra childcare costs because of the 
transplantation operation.235 It is welfare assistance, rather than financial reward and 
should continue to be provided under the proposed presumed consent system. 
4 The role of Organ Donation New Zealand 
Organ Donation New Zealand (ODNZ) is the national service for deceased organ and 
tissue donation, managed through the Auckland District Health Board and funded by 
the Ministry of Health.236 ODNZ co-ordinates organ donation and provides 
information and ongoing support to families of donors. It also audits donation 
practices in New Zealand and works with health professionals in donor hospitals to 
ensure there are nationally consistent processes for deceased donation, as well as 
providing education for health professionals.237  
Some of the services ODNZ currently provide include Link Teams, who act as 
liaisons for organ donation in ICU units in hospitals and donor co-ordinators who 
provide a 24-hour service for referrals from ICUs for organ donation and information 
and support for donor families throughout the process. ODNZ also organises 
'Thanksgiving Services' for individual donor families, and study days and professional 
education for ICU staff. 238 In terms of public awareness, ODNZ held a Thank You 
Day in 2012 to coincide with World Kidney Day, to thank donors and donor families. 
In 2012 ODNZ continued developing an education programme about transplantation 
to be used in schools throughout the country. A programme for 14 – 15 year old 
students is due to be released in 2013.239 General education resources can be found on 
the ODNZ website.240  
ODNZ's programmes are examples of non-legislative initiatives being undertaken 
with the aim of improving organ donation rates. Despite ODNZ's focus on 
improvement of organ and tissue donation, and the culture of altruism created by the 
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Thanksgiving Services, New Zealand has not shown an increased rate of organ 
donation. New Zealand should not rely only upon non-legislative initiatives to 
increase donation rates, but actively implement legal measures aimed at improving 
donation rates.  
D United Kingdom Experience 
The United Kingdom experience is similar to that of New Zealand. In January 2004 
the House of Commons debated the Organ Donation (Presumed Consent and 
Safeguards) Bill, which proposed a presumed consent system.241  The British Medical 
Association supported this move, having voted in favour of presumed consent at its 
annual meeting in 1999.242 Dr Michael Wilks, the Chairman of the British Medical 
Association's Ethics Committee argued in favour of presumed consent, noting, "we 
must increase the number of donors available and we believe that a system of 
presumed consent with safeguards, will do this."243 On the other hand, then Minister 
of State for Health Rosie Winterton ruled out the bill because of perceived ethical 
problems of the presumed consent system and said "full consent must be obtained to 
use human organs and tissue."244  
The UKHTA was passed in place of the Organ Donation (Presumed Consent and 
Safeguards) Bill. During the debates for what became the Human Tissue Act, 
presumed consent was again suggested as "one way to bridge the gap between what 
people say they want to do and what they actually do would be to adopt a system of 
presumed consent".245 Winterton noted that presumed consent had been given 
"serious consideration" but that the principle of the Act was informed consent.246 
However, UKHTA does implement a national register that takes precedence over the 
objections of family members.247 The UKHTA also prohibits commercial dealings in 
human material.248 The United Kingdom offers an interesting case study; although 
presumed consent was rejected, it was hotly debated, and the resulting UKHTA 
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provides stronger protections of informed consent and sanctions on sale of organs that 
the New Zealand HTA. Given the similarities between the United Kingdom system 
and the New Zealand system, New Zealand should model the strong aspects of the 
UKHTA, whilst spearheading reform through hard presumed consent. Interestingly, 
in September 2013, the National Assembly for Wales passed the Human 
Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013, which introduces soft presumed consent in 
Wales.249 The Act means that organ procurement in Wales is now different from that 
of the rest of the United Kingdom.250 The new system under the Act will not come 
into effect until 2015, to allow time for a major public information campaign.251 This 
paper suggests the same public education approach for the proposed New Zealand 
presumed consent system. 
VIII  Conclusion 
The worldwide shortage of organs has led to the growth of a black market in organ 
trade and an increase in organ trafficking. The transboundary nature of organ 
trafficking and transplant tourism means that it is an issue that requires both domestic 
and international regulation. A cohesive, holistic approach to reducing organ 
trafficking encompasses destination country enforcement, international conventions, 
extraterritorial criminalisation (particularly for importing states) and domestic self-
sufficiency in organ procurement.  This paper has focused on domestic self-
sufficiency. Destination country enforcement and extraterritorial criminalisation rely 
on states to prioritise, and enforce laws against organ trafficking; this has been shown 
to be lacking.  There has not yet been a decisive response from the international 
community. The international conventions concerning organ trafficking are vague and 
rely inter-state co-operation. Therefore, increasing the supply of organs locally is the 
most realistic option for reducing organ trafficking. States have an individual 
responsibility to amend their domestic legislation to address the organ shortage, rather 
than relying on international law, which cannot in itself provide a comprehensive 
solution to the organ trafficking problem. 
This paper has focused on New Zealand, as a window into how a state in the 
international community may increase local supply.  Hard presumed consent is the 
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system of organ procurement that has proven to effectively increase organ donation 
rates.  States, including New Zealand, should adopt presumed consent systems. 
Presumed consent weaves together the threads of individual autonomy and informed 
consent, fundamental principles of medical law, while remaining rooted in altruism.  
Implementing a system of presumed consent represents a starting point for addressing 
the international organ shortage, a root cause of organ trafficking. Any change in 
organ donation in system in New Zealand will require careful consideration of various 
cultural and societal perspectives, notably Māori perspectives. A move to presumed 
consent must be accompanied by effective infrastructure and public education. The 
discussion of proposed presumed consent in New Zealand provides a framework for 
other states who should also implement presumed consent, to harmonise global organ 
procurement. To do so, states must not only implement a legal framework for organ 
donation, but also focus on public education and community building. Only then may 
the worldwide shortage of organs be effectively addressed, and in turn, international 
organ trafficking.  
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Appendix 1: World Health Organisation Definitions 
All definitions are taken from the World Health Organisation "Global Glossary of 
Terms and Definitions on Donation and Transplantation" (Geneva, November 2009). 
Brain Death 
Irreversible cessation of cerebral and brain stem function; characterized by absence of 
electrical activity in the brain, blood flow to the brain, and brain function as 
determined by clinical assessment of responses. A brain dead person is dead, although 
his or her cardiopulmonary functioning may be artificially maintained for some time. 
Cardiac Death 
Death resulting from the irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory function; 
an individual who is declared dead by circulatory and respiratory criteria may donate 
tissues and organs for transplantation. 
Consent to donation  
Legally valid permission for removal of human cells, tissues and organs for 
transplantation. 
Donation  
Donating human cells, tissues or organs intended for human applications. 
Donor 
A human being, living or deceased, who is a source of cells, tissues or organs for the 
purpose of transplantation. 
 
Explicit consent  
Legally valid permission for removal of human cells, tissues and organs for 
transplantation, Otherwise known 
as 'opting in'. 
Exported / Export 
Human bodies, body parts, cells, tissues or organs for human application, legally 
procured inside of the national boundary and transported to another country where it 
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is to be further processed or used. Export must be according local (exporting country) 
laws, international laws and conventions and receiving country laws. 
Imported / Import 
Human bodies, body parts, cells, tissues and organs for human application, legally 
procured outside of the national boundary to which it has been transported for use. 
Importation must be according local (receiving country) laws, international laws and 
conventions and supplying country laws. 
Informed Consent A person's voluntary agreement, based upon adequate knowledge 
and understanding of relevant information, 
to participate in research or to undergo a diagnostic, therapeutic, or preventive 
procedure. 
Organ 
Differentiated and vital part of the human body, formed by different tissues, that 
maintains its structure, vascularisation and capacity to develop physiological 
functions with an important level of autonomy. 
Presumed consent Legally valid presumption of permission for removal of cells, 
tissues and organs for transplantation, in the 
absence of individual pre-stated refusal of permission. Otherwise known as 'opting 
out'. 
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Appendix 2: Statistics from the ANZDATA Registry 2012 Annual Report.  
These statistics offer some insight into the demographics of organ donors in New 
Zealand 
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Appendix 3: Statutes 
Human Tissue Act 2008 
Section 56 Trading in human tissue generally prohibited 
(1) No person may, except under an exemption under section 60, require or accept, 
or offer or provide, financial or other consideration for human tissue. 
(2) A person commits an offence, and is liable on summary con- viction to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 1 year or a fine not exceeding $50,000, if—  
(a) the person intentionally or knowingly does an act; and  
(b) that act contravenes subsection (1). 
United Kingdom Human Tissue Act 2004 
Trafficking 
Section 32  Prohibition of commercial dealings in human material for 
transplantation 
(1) A person commits an offence if he— 
(a) gives or recieves a reward for the supply of, or for an offer to supply, any 
controlled material; 
(b) seeks to find a person willing to supply any controlled material for reward; 
(c) offers to supply any controlled material for reward; 
(d) initiates or negotiates any arrangement involving the giving of a reward for 
the supply of, or for an offer to supply, any controlled material; 
(e) takes part in the management or control of a body of persons corporate or 
unincorporate whose activities consist of or include the initiation or 
negotiation of such arrangements. 
Crimes Act 1961 
Section 98D Trafficking in people by means of coercion or deception 
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(1) Every one is liable to the penalty stated in subsection (2) who— 
 
(a) arranges the entry of a person into New Zealand or any other State by 1 
or more acts of coercion against the person, 1 or more acts of deception of 
the person, or both; or 
(b) arranges, organises, or procures the reception, concealment, or 
harbouring in New Zealand or any other State of a person, knowing that the 
person's entry into New Zealand or that State was arranged by 1 or more 
acts of coercion against the person, 1 or more acts of deception of the 
person, or both. 
(2) The penalty is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years, a fine not 
exceeding $500,000, or both. 
 
(3) Proceedings may be brought under this section even if the person coerced or 
deceived— 
 
(a) did not in fact enter the State concerned; or (as the case may be) 
 
(b) was not in fact received, concealed, or harboured in the State concerned. 
 
(4) Proceedings may be brought under this section even if parts of the process by 
which the person coerced or deceived was brought or came to or towards the State 
concerned were accomplished without an act of coercion or deception. 
 
Section 98E Aggravating factors 
 
(1) When determining the sentence to be imposed on, or other way of dealing with, 
a person convicted of an offence against section 98C or section 98D, a court must 
take into account— 
 
(a) whether bodily harm or death (whether to or of a person in respect of 
whom the offence was committed or some other person) occurred during 
the commission of the offence: 
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(b) whether the offence was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, 
or in association with, an organised criminal group (within the meaning 
of section 98A(2)): 
 
(c) whether a person in respect of whom the offence was committed was 
subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment as a result of the commission 
of the offence: 
 
(d) if during the proceedings concerned the person was convicted of the 
same offence in respect of 2 or more people, the number of people in 
respect of whom the offence was committed. 
 
(2) When determining the sentence to be imposed on, or other way of dealing with, 
a person convicted of an offence against section 98D, a court must also take into 
account— 
 
(a) whether a person in respect of whom the offence was committed was 
subjected to exploitation (for example, sexual exploitation, a requirement to 
undertake forced labour, or the removal of organs) as a result of the 
commission of the offence: 
 
(b) the age of the person in respect of whom the offence was committed 
and, in particular, whether the person was under the age of 18 years: 
 
(c) whether the person convicted committed the offence, or took actions that 
were part of it, for a material benefit. 
 
(3) The examples in paragraph (a) of subsection (2) do not limit the generality of 
that paragraph. 
 
(4) This section does not limit the matters that a court may take into account when 
determining the sentence to be imposed on, or other way of dealing with, a person 
convicted of an offence against section 98C or section 98D. 
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Section 98F Attorney-General's consent to prosecutions required 
 
(1) Proceedings for an offence against section 98C or section 98D cannot be 
brought in a New Zealand court without the Attorney-General's consent. 
 
(2) A person alleged to have committed an offence against section 98C or section 
98D may be arrested, or a warrant for the person's arrest may be issued and 
executed, and the person be remanded in custody or on bail, even though the 
Attorney-General's consent to the bringing of proceedings against the person has 
not been obtained. 
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